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Abstract
This article examines how corporate insolvencies in China, the
second largest economy, are handled under the current
legislation, the China Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of 2006.
Relying on the fresh empirical data arising from the first ten years
on the use of China’s three insolvency procedures,
reorganization, composition and liquidation, this article reveals
the huge gap between the law in the books and the law in action,
arguing that the implementation of this law in China perhaps has
not achieved the legislative objectives. The constitutional and
institutional weaknesses affecting the application of this law are
analyzed.
Key Words: China, Insolvency, Bankruptcy, Reorganization,
Composition and Liquidation.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2006, China promulgated its first rescue-oriented Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law of 2006 (the EBL 2006) with the objectives of facilitating
more corporate reorganizations, establishing a market-based corporate
insolvency profession and of enhancing cross-border insolvencies. Given
that more than ten years have passed after the new law became effective
since 2007, time seems to be ripe to investigate whether the
implementation of this law is a success or a failure. Bearing in mind this
question, this article particularly sheds light on the use of the three
corporate insolvency procedures, reorganization, composition and
liquidation under this law and finds that unfortunately little improvement
has been made in the past decade.
To explain why such a conclusion is reached, the article uses three
parts to untangle the Chinese corporate bankruptcy law both in the books
and in action. Part 1 gives a brief account about the history of China’s
bankruptcy law. Part 2 considers the main features of the EBL 2006 and
examines the extent to which its legislative goals have been achieved. Part
3 analyses the three insolvency procedures, reorganization, composition
and liquidation, under this law, investigating the contrast between law and
reality. Some policy reflections are placed at the conclusion.

II.

HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT
CHINA

OF

BANKRUPTCY LAW

IN

China’s first bankruptcy law can be traced back to 1905, when the
Royal Court of the Qing Dynasty enacted the Bankruptcy Law of 1905,1
which regulates the bankruptcy of both individuals and companies. 2 But
this law was unexpectedly revoked in 1907 for unknown reasons.3 Almost
* Lecturer of law at School of Law, University of Leeds, Email: z.zhang2@leeds.ac.uk.
The author wishes to thank the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for
funding this study under the grant ES/P004040/1 entitled “boosting growth through
strengthening investor and creditor protection in China.” The views expressed in this article
are of the author’s own and do not represent the funding agency.
1
XU Lizhi, Qing Mo Shangshi Lifa Yianjiu [Commercial Legislation in the Late Qing
Dynasty] (Research Paper of the China Academy of Social Science Institute of Law)
https://iolaw.org.cn/showNews.aspx?id=2367.
2
CHANG NIEH-YUN, TRANSLATION OF THE CHINESE BANKRUPTCY CODE OF 1905 1-17
(1907).
3
Chen Xiahong, Jingdai Zhongguo De Pochan Fazhi Jiqi Mingyun [The Modern China’s
Bankruptcy Laws and Their Fates], 28 Zhenfa Luntang [Tribune of Political Science and
Law] 57, 60 (2010).
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three decades later, in 1935, the China Legislative Yuan, the parliament of
the republic government led by the Kuomintang Nationalist Party,
promulgated the China Bankruptcy Law of 1935; unlike the 1905
bankruptcy law under which a bankruptcy procedure is mainly managed
by a civil society, a local chamber of commerce, the 1935 Bankruptcy Law
designates law courts to supervise the bankruptcy of both individuals and
companies.4
Little is known about the extent to which the 1935 Bankruptcy Law
was implemented, but one thing is certain: China was then in the military
chaos between the republicans and the communist rebels. After the
communists finally won the civil war in 1949, all legislations enacted by
the republic government, including the 1935 bankruptcy law, were scraped
by the new regime in the mainland of China, although most of these laws
are still in operation in the Taiwan Island to which the republicans
retreated.5
After the communist party took control of China since 1949, perhaps
because of the planned economy as well as the communist ideology,6 using
bankruptcy law to solve business failures seemed to be unnecessary, and
even some communist ideologues believe they could build a bankruptcyfree economy.7 Apparently, this was unrealistic, as late Mr. Cao Siyuan, a
leading figure in China’s central government in charge of drafting the first
socialist bankruptcy law, argues that bankruptcy is inevitable in both
socialist and capitalist economies.8 It is not a surprise that, under the
pressure to deal with money-losing state-owned enterprises (SOEs),9
China, early in the 1980s, eventually resumed the effort to make a
bankruptcy law, which resulted in the promulgation of the China
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of 1986 (the EBL 1986).10
Given the dominant state sector in the Chinese economy when the
EBL 1986 was made, this law only applies to SOEs.11 It is noteworthy that
the real policy intention of enacting the EBL 1986 is arguably not to
4

Article 2 of the China Bankruptcy Law of 1935.
Chen Xiahong, Mingguo Pochanfa De Qicaozhai [The Draftsman of the 1935 China
Bankruptcy Law], Fazhi Ribao [Legal Daily] Oct. 27, 2016, 11.
6
Cao Siyuan, Shi Lun Shixing Qiye Pochanfa De Biyao Xing [The Necessity of Enforcing
a Law of Bankruptcy in China], 5 Gai Ge [Reform] 25, 26 (1985).
7
Cao Siyuan, Guanyu Zhiding Pochanfa De Jiangyi [Proposal to Make a Bankruptcy Law
in China], 11 Shehui Kexue [Social Sciences] 42 (1984).
8
Chen Jianfu, The Making of an Enterprise Bankruptcy Law in the PRC, 25 Law Context:
A Socio-Legal Journal 77, 78 (2007).
9
Carsten A Holz, Economic Reforms and State Sector Bankruptcy in China, 166 China
Quarterly 342, 343 (2001).
10
Peng Xiaohua, Characteristics of China’s First Bankruptcy Law, 28 Harv. Int’l L. J. 373
(1987).
11
Article 2 of the EBL 1986.
5
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liquidate inefficient and bankrupt SOEs as well as not to protect
creditors,12 rather the Chinese decision-makers aimed to use this law to
warn SOEs to operate more efficiently.13 The EBL 1986 has two
bankruptcy procedures, reorganization and liquidation. As noted by
Professor Wang Weiguo, reorganization under this law is probably never
used in practice,14 partly because of its procedural absurdity.15 Although
several thousands of enterprise bankruptcy liquidation cases in total were
dealt with by the Chinese courts following the promulgation of this law
before the EBL 2006 was enacted, first, over half of these cases were
actually to liquidate so-called collectively-owned enterprises,16 which are
managed either by local government or by their parent SOEs, and second,
the bankruptcy of most failed SOEs was handled by the government
through administrative channels.17
Arguably, to make the Chinese enterprise bankruptcy law look more
inclusive, or perhaps to alleviate the criticism that SOEs and other
enterprises are treated unequally at least in theory, when drafting the China
Civil Procedure Law of 1991, the China People’s Congress inserted a
chapter on the bankruptcy for non-SOE enterprises, including private and
foreign-invested ones, Chapter 19, into this law.18 Similar to the EBL
1986, the bankruptcy chapter in the Civil Procedure Law of 1991 also has
two major bankruptcy procedures, reorganization and liquidation. But this
chapter shares the same weakness with the EBL 1986: both are overly
skeleton and considerably vague.19 This led to some commenting that the
Chinese bankruptcy law is more like a policy statement rather than a law
full of details intended to be used in practice.20 Up until then, at least on
the statutory books, it seems that China has fully established the

12

Douglass G Boshkoff & Yongxin Song, China’s New Bankruptcy Law: A Translation
and Brief Introduction, 61 Am. Bankr. L. J. 359, 361 (1987).
13
CCIC Finance Ltd v Guangdong International and Investment Corp. [2005] HKEC
1180.
14
Weiguo Wang, Adopting Corporate Rescue Regimes in China, A Comparative Survey,
9 Aust. J. Corp. L. 234, 238 (1998).
15
Michael Minor & Karen J Stevens-Minor, China’s Emerging Bankruptcy Law, 22 Int’l
Law.1217, 1221 (1988).
16
Li Shuguang, Bankruptcy Law in China: Lessons of the Past Twelve Years, 3 Harv. Asia
Q.1 (2006) .
17
Weiguo Wang & Charles Booth, ‘Study on Alternative Approaches for Debt
Restructuring of Enterprises in China’ (Report of the Project on ‘Debt Restructuring of
Enterprise from the State Economy and Trade Commission of China) 29-30.
18
Chapter 19 of the China Civil Procedure Law 1991.
19
Michael Minor & Karen J Stevens-Minor, China’s Emerging Bankruptcy Law, 22 Int’l
Law.1217, 1220 (1998).
20
Donald C Clarke, ‘China, Creating a Legal System for a Market Economy’ (Asian
Development Bank 2007) 7.
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bankruptcy law system for enterprises in all ownerships, although China
has not yet made a bankruptcy law for individuals since.21
As mentioned before, in spite of an inclusive bankruptcy system on
the statute books, translating the law into reality remained a formidable
challenge; in general, both bankruptcy laws were only occasionally used
by local government, through local courts, to liquidate enterprises that
were state- or collectively-owned,22 by contrast, for private companies, the
bankruptcy law was virtually not available.23
Apparently, the dire situation of the implementation of the bankruptcy
law did not catch up with China’s unprecedented economic growth
especially after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 as well as the rapid
expansion of the Chinese private economies;24 the calls for an effective
corporate bankruptcy system from inside China and outside grew louder,25
and this resulted in the promulgation of a unified enterprise bankruptcy
law, the EBL 2006, years after China was admitted to the WTO.26 Many
believe that China enacted the modern EBL 2006 in an effort to provide
an orderly exit for failed businesses and to protect creditors,27 but some
doubt that the promulgation of the EBL 2006 might superficially serve as
a legislative gesture to impress China’s WTO partners, only.28

III.

MAJOR FEATURES OF THE
BANKRUPTCY LAW OF 2006

CHINA

ENTERPRISE

In fact, China’s endeavor to revamp its enterprise bankruptcy law
began as early as in 1994,29 and twelve years later it finally bore fruit: The
21

Haizheng Zhang & Xiaohe Tan, ‘Bankruptcy Petition and Acceptance’ in CHINA’S NEW
ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY LAW: CONTEXT, INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 76 (Rebecca
Parry, Yongqian Xu and Haizheng Zhang eds., 2010).
22
Shuguang Li, Bankruptcy Law in China: Lessons of the Past Twelve Years, 3 Harv. Asia
Q. 1 (2006).
23
Sheryl Miller, Institutional Impediments to the Enforcement of China’s Bankruptcy
Laws, 8 Int’l Legal Persp. 187, 191 (1996).
24
Joseph Kahn, ‘World Trade Organization Admits China, Amid Doubts’ New York Times
(New York 11 November 2001) A16.
25
United States Trade Representative, ‘2016 Report to Congress on China’s WTO
Compliance’ (January 2017) 170.
26
Tom Young, Enterprising Reform: China’s New Bankruptcy Law Represents More Than
Comfort for Creditors, 26 Int’l Financial L. Rev. 60 (2007).
27
OECD, CHINA, DEFINING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE MARKET AND THE STATE 53
(2009).
28
Campbell Korff & Xinhong Liu, Why China’s Insolvency Regime Must Improve, 21 Int’l
Financial L. Rev. 33, 35 (2002).
29
Weiguo Wang, Corporate Governance and the Draft Bankruptcy Law of China, 17 Aust.
J. Corp. L. 111, 112 (2004).
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EBL 2006 was passed by the China People’s Congress Standing
Committee, the executive branch of the Chinese parliament, on 27 August
2006, taking effect from 1 June 2007.30 In the course of drafting the EBL
2006, the lawmakers studied the bankruptcy law from a number of
jurisdictions, including the USA, UK, France and Germany; and it is fair
to say that the American Chapter 11, to a large extent, helped reshape the
EBL 2006.31 But the lawmakers, it seems, did not effectively consult their
own business people when deliberating this law, which is a key
constitutional defect of the Chinese law-making. Compared with the
previous bankruptcy statutes, however, the EBL 2006 marks a significant
step forward on a number of fronts.
First, the EBL 2006 is the first rescue-oriented bankruptcy law in
China. It comprises three substantial chapters, chapters 8 on
reorganization, 9 on composition and 10 on liquidation; the order of the
three chapters, arguably, reflects the intention of the Congress to prioritize
the use of reorganization.32 If this is true, it may rather ironically expose
the naivety of these lawmakers, since the primary goal of a bankruptcy
law, arguably, is to liquidate inefficient and bankrupt businesses.33
Unfortunately, at least from 2007 to 2015, the new rescue procedure under
the EBL 2006 was only occasionally used – in most years less than 100
reorganization cases can be identified in China – at the request of local
government, to rehabilitate some large companies in China,34 and even it
is safe to say that the new corporate reorganization procedure is virtually
not available for businesses in practice, mainly due to the weak rule of law
in the country. Chinese law courts routinely ignore the reorganization
judicial demands from desperate businesses.
To promote corporate rescues, under the EBL 2006 Article 2, a
company that is bankrupt or is likely to be bankrupt can enter into the
voluntary reorganization procedure, which means that an early rescue can
be attempted at a time when the company is on the verge of bankruptcy
rather than is already in a bankruptcy trouble,35 but this Article falls short
30

The preface of the EBL 2006.
Weiguo Wang, Adopting Corporate Rescue Regimes, 9 Aust, J. Corp. L. 234 (1998).
32
Zou Hailin, Woguo Qiye Zaishen Chenxu De Zhidu Fengxi He Shiyu [China’s Corporate
Reorganisation Procedure: Theories and Practice], 25 Zhengfa Luntan [Tribune of Political
Science and Law] 48, 50-1 (2007).
33
Bruce G Carruthers & Terence C Halliday, Institutionalizing Creative Destruction:
Predictable and Transparent Bankruptcy Law in the Wake of the East Asian Financial
Crisis, in MEREDITH JUNG-EN WOO (ED), NEOLIBERALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN
EAST ASIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 244 (2007).
34
ZHANG ZINIAN, CORPORATE REORGANISATIONS IN CHINA: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
CHAPTER 2 (2018).
35
Wang Liming, Pochan Lifa Zhong De Ruogan Yinan Wenti Tantao [The Enterprise
Bankruptcy Bill: An Analysis], 3 Fa Xue [Legal Science] 3, 11 (2005).
31
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of unequivocally clarifying that a company placed in a voluntary
bankruptcy reorganization procedure does not need to show the evidence
of bankruptcy.36 Not surprisingly, in reality, this legal innovation under
the EBL 2006 is simply disregarded by Chinese courts, since opening an
in-court corporate reorganization procedure, as evidenced in the existing
reorganizations, still needs to pass both the cash flow and balance sheet
bankruptcy tests.37
To improve the feasibility of a corporate rescue, the EBL 2006 Article
73 allows the debtor, especially its board of directors, to manage the
company’s assets and business affairs during the reorganization
procedure, which means the debtor-in-possession model under the
American Chapter 11 has been transplanted into the Chinese bankruptcy
law.38 But, the Chinese version of debtor-in-possession is slightly different
from that under Chapter 11.
On the one hand, the Chinese debtor-in-possession model is a
conditional one: Where a reorganization procedure is commenced, a
bankruptcy administrator will be simultaneously appointed by the court to
take control of the company; but the debtor is, under the EBL 2006 Article
73, eligible to apply for debtor-in-possession afterwards, and if approved
by the court, the bankruptcy administrator will return the control of the
company to the debtor. The concern here is that Article 73 does not specify
what conditions must be met when the court assesses the debtor-inpossession application.39 It is equally true that if the debtor does not apply
or if the court rejects the application, the company in reorganization will
continue being controlled and managed by the court-appointed bankruptcy
administrator. By contrast, the debtor-in-possession model under the US
Chapter 11 is a default one and is routinely used.40
On the other hand, if granted, the Chinese debtor-in-possession,
compared with Chapter 11, seems to be more generous to the debtor: The
debtor in possession under the EBL 2006 will be given the exclusive right
of proposing a reorganization plan during the entire reorganization
procedure;41 in comparison, its American counterpart’ monopoly on this
is only limited during the first 120 days.42 Some argue that others parties
could be allowed to propose a competing reorganization plan, which is
36

11 USC § 301.
See note 34 above at chapter 2 especially.
38
Emily Lee, The Reorganisation Process under China’s Corporate Bankruptcy System,
45 Int’l Law. 939, 942 (2011).
39
Yongqing Ren, The ‘Control Model’ in Chinese Bankruptcy Reorganisation Law and
Practice, 85 Am. Bankr. L. J. 177, 180 (2011).
40
11 USC § 1104 and § 1107.
41
The EBL 2006 Article 80.
42
11 USC § 1121 (b).
37
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subject to the vote of affected parties, and the current restriction under the
EBL 2006, it seems, cannot be justified.43
Although many argue that the use of debtor-in-possession should be
the norm rather than the exception under the EBL 2006, especially given
that it encourages an early rescue and can take advantage of the expertise
of former managers, an empirical study suggests it is only applied in less
than twenty per cent of the existing corporate reorganizations in China,
and more importantly, the debtor-in-possession in action might have
considerably deviated from the original design, since although the debtorin-possession is superficially installed, many key reorganization decisions
are still made by court-appointed administrators.44
Meanwhile, to facilitate more rescue outcomes, under the EBL 2006
Article 87, in the event that a reorganization plan has been voted down by
either the meeting of creditors or of shareholders or both, it may still be
forcibly approved by the court if certain statutory conditions are satisfied,
which means a Chapter 11-style cram down is also adopted by the EBL
2006. Overall, the EBL 2006 appears to be considerably rescue-oriented.
Second, the EBL 2006 evolves from the old law under which an
enterprise bankruptcy procedure relies on a local government organized
liquidation committee to manage the estate45 to an international ‘best
practice’ whereby an insolvency administrator, who may be chosen from
qualified lawyers or accountants, will be appointed to do the job, namely
the new law embraces insolvency professionalism.46 Article 24 of the EBL
2006 authorizes the China Supreme People’s Court to make the rules on
the qualification and remuneration of insolvency practitioners in
bankruptcy services.
Creating an insolvency practitioner system in China by the EBL 2006
is widely acclaimed domestically and internationally,47 since using
qualified practitioners to manage companies in bankruptcy may
considerably reduce government intervention so as to improve fairness
and efficiency of the corporate bankruptcy system. But the problem is that
the EBL 2006 Article 24 still retains government-organized liquidation
committees, alongside qualified insolvency practitioners, to be appointed
as bankruptcy administrators. Although the lawmakers’ intention,

43

Rakhi I Patel, A Practical Evaluation of the People’s Republic of China’s 2007
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, 10 U.C. Davis Bus. L. J. 109, 114 (2009).
44
See note 34 above at chapter 2.
45
The EBL 1986 Article 24, and the China Civil Procedure Law 1991 Article 201.
46
The EBL 2006 Article 24.
47
Charles D Booth, The 2006 PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: The Wait is Finally Over,
20 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 275, 292-5 (2008).
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arguably, is to reserve such committees only for the bankruptcy of SOEs,48
this has not been clearly written in the law, which may result in confusion
or abuse.49
Another problem of China’s new insolvency practitioner system is that
it is the law court that can appoint a bankruptcy administrator, and that
both debtor and creditor are not allowed to make a nomination, let alone
an appointment. Given the poor record of the Chinese court system on
judicial independence and on corruption,50 this may cast a shadow over
whether bankruptcy administrators will prioritize the interest of creditors
and over whether government intervention through law courts will persist
in China’s corporate bankruptcies.51 But it seems fair to say that
establishing the Chinese insolvency profession itself is a step forward in
the right direction.
But the major concern is that there are few cases for newly qualified
insolvency practitioners in China to gain experience. Following the
enactment of the EBL 2006, the China national number of corporate
bankruptcy cases surprisingly declined from 4,755 in 2006 to 2059 in
2014.52 Given the size of the Chinese economy, such numbers means that
for the majority of newly qualified insolvency practitioners there is no
bankruptcy case to practice. Without having real bankruptcy businesses, it
is virtually impossible for this new profession to develop.
Third, the EBL 2006 advocates collaboration on cross-border
insolvencies, and its Article 5 uses the modified universality principle to
deal with these challenges.53 This is somewhat due to the influence of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, which was
published in 199754 and helped remind some Chinese liberal scholars who
48

Jiang Qiangui, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Pochanfa Caoan Xiuga Qingkuang
De Huibao [Report of the Revisions on the China Enterprise Bankruptcy Bill], 7 Quanguo
Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Gongbao [The Journal of the China People’s
Congress Standing Committee] 579, 581 (2006).
49
Li Shuguang & Wang Zuofa, Zhongguo Pochanfa Shishi Sannian Lai De Shizhen
Fengxi: Lifa Yuqi Yu Sifa Shijian De Chaju Jiqi Jiejue Lujing [The Gap between
Expectation of Legislation and Judicial Practice and its Resolution: Empirical Analysis of
Bankruptcy Law’s Three-Years Implementation], 2 Zhengfa Luntan [The Journal of China
University of Political Science and Law 58, 62 (2011).
50
Ling Li, The ‘Production’ of Corruption in China’s Courts: Judicial Politics and
Decision Making in a One-Party State, 37 Law & Soc. Inquiry 847, 877 (2012).
51
Roman Tomasic & Zinian Zhang, The Political Determinants of Corporate
Reorganisation in China, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ASIAN LAW 125 (Christoph Antons
ed., 2017).
52
These figures are from the China Law Yearbook (2003-2014).
53
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 Mich. L. Rev.
2296 (2000).
54
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), UNCITRAL
Model
Law
on
Cross-Border
Insolvency
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joined the making of the EBL 2006 to be open-minded.55 In particular, this
Article states that a corporate bankruptcy ruling by a Chinese court binds
the company’s assets located domestically and abroad, and that equally a
foreign bankruptcy ruling can also bind the company’s assets located in
China but on the condition that such a ruling must be recognized by a
Chinese court in the first place.56 This Article sets up some restrictions on
recognition of a foreign bankruptcy judgement.
Specifically, for an overseas bankruptcy judgement, the foreign
country must have a judicial assistance treaty, bilateral or multilateral,
with China, and if not, reciprocity on this must have been established;
more important is that recognizing a foreign bankruptcy judgement cannot
violate China’s fundamental legal principles, sovereignty, national
security and public interests, in addition to the rights of domestic
creditors.57 Some argue that the tone of this Article is considerably hostile,
which might make recognition of foreign bankruptcy judgements a
difficult task.58 It is also worth noting that China has not yet ascertained
what fundamental legal principles, sovereignty, national security and
public interests really mean, and such vagueness may lead to much
uncertainty. With regard to reciprocity, the attitude of the Chinese court
system seems to be that a foreign country must show goodwill at first by
recognizing a Chinese law court ruling, and it appears that no Chinese
court has, unilaterally and proactively, recognized a foreign court
judgement so as to pave the way for establishing the reciprocity, although
many call the Chinese courts to be forward-thinking and internationally
friendly.
As for the worldwide effect of China’s corporate bankruptcy rulings,
many doubt that this is somewhat self-deceiving, since before being
recognized by a foreign court, a Chinese bankruptcy ruling is meaningless
on a foreign land; but supporters insist that it better than to say nothing.59
Of course, a Chinese corporate bankruptcy ruling must be recognized by
a foreign court prior to legally binding the company’s assets residing
overseas.

<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model.html>
accessed 1 December 2017.
55
Wang Weiguo, Zou Hailin and Li Yongjun, Pochan Fa Shinian [Ten Years of Drafting
the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law] (Seminar of the Civil and Commercial Law Centre, China
University of Political Science and Law, 12 March 2004) 1.
56
The EBL 2006 Article 5 Paragraph 1.
57
The EBL 2006 Article 5 Paragraph 2.
58
Steven J Arsenault, Leaping over the Great Wall: Examining Cross-Border Insolvency
in China under the Chinese Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 21 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1,
22 (2011).
59
See note 53 above.
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In practice, seeking the recognition of a foreign bankruptcy ruling in
a Chinese court by relying on the EBL 2006 Article 5 seems to be a
formidable task; after the EBL 2006 took effect since 2007, there was no
reported recognition of foreign bankruptcy judgements. The recent two
high profile cases, the bankruptcy rehabilitation of Hanjin Shipping
Limited in 2016 taking place in South Korea60 and the administration of
Lehman Brothers (Europe) Limited in 2008 opened in the UK,61 both of
them having assets located in China, suggest that some, if not most,
Chinese courts may not only ignore foreign bankruptcy rulings but also
turn a blind eye to the recognition application by foreign bankruptcy
office-holders.62 On the contrary, obtaining the judicial recognition of a
Chinese bankruptcy ruling abroad is relatively easy, especially in some
advanced jurisdictions that have adopted the UNCITRL Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency; years ago, a corporate reorganization ruling
from a Zhejiang court in China was recognized in the USA, serving a good
example on this.63
To sum up, at the first glance, the EBL 2006 looks very modern and
seems to be similar with the bankruptcy legislations in many developed
jurisdictions, but the greatest challenge is how to translate the law into
practice, especially given China’s weak judicial system and the lack of the
respect to the rule of law. Specifically, more problems can be identified by
examining the use of the three major insolvency procedures in China since
2007.

IV.

THE THREE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY PROCEDURES
UNDER THE EBL 2006

As noted above, the EBL 2006 comprises three major corporate
insolvency procedures, reorganization, composition and liquidation.
Under the old EBL 1986, there is also a corporate reorganization
60

Shi Jingxia & Huang Yuanyuan, Kuajie Pochan Zhong De Chenren Yu Jiuji Zhidu: Jiyu
Hanjin Pochan An De Guancha Yu Fengxi [The Recognition and Relief in Cross-Border
Insolvency – a Perspective from Hanjin Shipping Co.,] 2 Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Xuebao
[Journal of Renmin University of China] 34, 35 (2017).
61
Fenxiang Zhang, Cong Huaan Jijing Yu Leiman Ouzhou Jingrong Yanshen Chanping
Touzi Hezuo An Kan Woguo Xiangguan Falu Zhidu De Wanshan [Lessons of Hua An v
Lehman Brothers Europe], in Jingrong Fazhi Qiangyan [HERALD OF RULE OF LAW ON
FINANCE] 79 (Yong Qing ed., 2011).
62
Steven T Kargman, Emerging Economies and Cross-Border Regimes: Missing BRICs in
the International Insolvency Architecture (Part II), 7 Insolvency and Restructuring
International 6, 8-9 (2013).
63
In Re Zhejiang Topoint Photovoltaic Co., Ltd [2015] United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of New Jersey 14-24549.
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procedure, but it is too rudimentary to match its title;64 more strikingly, as
noted before, the old reorganization procedure probably has never been
used. In contrast, the reorganization procedure under the EBL 2006 is far
more comprehensive and reflects many rescue mechanisms used in some
advanced jurisdictions.65

a. The Reorganization Procedure under the EBL 2006
Reorganization applicants: Under the EBL 2006 Article 7, both the
debtor and its creditors can file for the reorganization of the company
before a local court; as noted above, in the case of a voluntary filing, under
the EBL 2006 Article 2, even the company that is not bankrupt but is likely
to be bankrupt can enter into reorganization at an early stage. Again, as
mentioned before, this provision is virtually neglected in practice,
although the legislative intention is well presented.
For creditor applicants, the EBL 2006 Article 7 is clear: where the
debtor company is unable to pay the debt which is due, the creditor can
file for the bankruptcy reorganization of the debtor, which means passing
a cash-flow bankruptcy test is sufficient for a creditor to bring a defaulting
debtor into a bankruptcy reorganization procedure. The reality, however,
is that this provision is also flouted by Chinese courts; instead, according
to the existing reorganization filings, for a filing creditor, one of the
conditions to commence a corporate reorganization procedure is to
convince courts that both cash-flow and balance-sheet bankruptcy tests are
satisfied.66 These make the entry of reorganization considerably difficult.
To start a reorganization procedure, except a straightforward
reorganization application filed either by the debtor or by its creditors, in
the event of an involuntary liquidation procedure, the debtor or its
shareholder(s) holding more than ten per cent of the company’s equity
may, under the EBL 2006 Article 70, apply to the court to convert
liquidation into reorganization. But the concern here is that if the company
is already financially insolvent, in view of the fact that shareholders might
have no substantial interest in the company, empowering shareholders to
change the course of bankruptcy might be financially unjustifiable. More
problematic is that whether to convert liquidation into reorganization
should be ultimately decided by the court rather than by the creditors, and
64
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this may rather undermine creditor protection in corporate bankruptcy
procedures in China. But the key legislative message here is clear: the EBL
2006 advocates the entry of reorganization.
An early empirical study suggests that some sixty per cent of the
surveyed corporate reorganization applicants under the new EBL 2006 are
debtors and the rest of them are creditors; a conversion from liquidation
into reorganization happens only in around five per cent of all
reorganizations. But it is worth addressing that whoever is the
reorganization applicant, without the political support of local
government, opening an in-court corporate reorganization is highly
unlikely.67 Local government not only plays a key role in deciding whether
a reorganization procedure can be initiated but also takes control of
judicial corporate reorganizations thereafter in one form or another.
Control models of China’s corporate reorganizations: Whatever a
reorganization, composition or liquidation procedure, under the EBL 2006
Article 13, an insolvency practitioner, which is, in many cases, a qualified
law or accounting firm, will be immediately appointed by the court as the
bankruptcy administrator to take control of the company by replacing the
previous management. But given that reorganization is aimed to
rehabilitate rather than to liquidate companies in trouble, as noted before,
following the beginning of a reorganization procedure, under the EBL
2006 Article 73, the debtor, particularly the company’s management, can
apply to the court for debtor-in-possession. It is equally true that the courtappointed administrator will remain in office if the debtor does not apply
for debtor-in-possession or if its application is rejected by the court.
Hence, the control model of China’s corporate reorganizations seems to
be a hybrid, embracing both the practitioner- and debtor-in-possession
model widely used in the UK and the USA respectively.
In reality, debtor-in-possession is not used as frequently as expected
in China, since it is found that the conversion from practitioner- into
debtor-in-possession is only approved in some eighteen per cent of the
surveyed reorganizations.68 But the real challenge is that the current
debtor-in-possession might have substantially deviated from what is
originally intended in the EBL 2006, because although debtor-inpossession is allowed, many key decisions are still made by courtappointed administrators; for example, in many surveyed cases, debtor-inpossession is somewhat used to merely retain the previous management to
maintain the day-to-day operation of the company in reorganization, but
some vital decisions, like choosing a company buyer, are actually made
67
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by reorganization administrators. In this situation, the debtor occupies the
driving seat under the debtor-in-possession model, but the substantial
decision-making is in the hands of court-appointed administrators who are
supposed to be supervisors only.
What should be pointed out is that whether debtor-in-possession is
used or not, local government, to a large extent, controls the reorganization
of a local company in one way or another.69 For example, a liquidation
committee might be formed by local government and is later appointed by
the court as the reorganization administrator; sometimes, local
government stays in the shadow by forming a political supporting
committee to direct the course of the reorganization of a local large
company, which might be a state-owned or even a private enterprise;70 so
in real terms, arguably, China uses a kind of government-in-possession in
its corporate reorganizations, which might be an entire departure from
what is originally envisaged.71
Corporate reorganization plans: Under the EBL 2006 Article 79, a
reorganization plan must be proposed within six months after the company
entered into reorganization, and a three-month extension can be granted
by the court on request, if the court believes that it is reasonable. Using the
word “reasonable” somewhat means that an extension can be given fully
at the discretion of the court.
But it seems to be a surprise that a reorganization plan can only be
exclusively proposed by the administrator if debtor-in-possession is not in
use, and that such a monopoly is offered to the debtor otherwise. Other
parties, especially creditors, are not officially allowed to propose an
alternative reorganization plan for a vote.
But in practice, given that most China’s corporate reorganizations use
company sale rescues, a reorganization plan is more or less the result of
an intense bargaining between major creditors and company buyers;72
namely the real reorganization plan makers are major creditors and
company buyers instead of debtors or administrators; therefore, to a certain
extent, it seems that it is not a matter of concern over who is officially
eligible to propose a reorganization plan. Of course, ideally, when
amending the EBL 2006, other key parties, including creditors and
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members, could be given the chance to make a competing rescue
proposal.73
Under the EBL 2006 Article 81, a reorganization plan may comprise
two substantial elements, one to update the company’s business operation
and the other to restructure the company’s debts. This Article does not
mention how to deal with the equity of the company in a reorganization
plan, and probably it leaves this gap for stakeholders to fill in practice.
Bearing in mind the prevalent company sale reorganizations in China, the
content of most reorganization plans is on how to restructure the
company’s debts, and usually there is little ink spilled on how to
reorganize the company’s business; probably revitalizing the company’s
business is better left for company buyers to sort out subsequent to the
judicial reorganization procedure.
A reorganization plan, under the EBL 2006 Articles 86 and 87, will
not take effect unless it successfully goes through the two stages, first a
vote by the creditors and second an approval by the court. For the voting
purpose, under the EBL 2006 Article 82, creditors are separated into four
classes, the secured, employee, tax, and ordinary unsecured creditors, to
vote on the proposed reorganization plan; the plan, a reorganization
proposal, is passed if it is voted for by over half of the attending creditors
holding over two-thirds of the claims in each class. Under the EBL 2006
Article 86, a reorganization plan that has been voted in favor by all classes
of creditors may be submitted to the court for confirmation/approval; the
court will approve the voted plan if it believes that the plan generally
conforms to the EBL 2006; this Article does not say which articles or
provisions of the EBL 2006 should be specifically complied with. In
practice, all reorganization plans that are voted for by creditors are
smoothly approved by the courts.
The contentious issue here might be that a reorganization plan that
affects the equity of shareholders must, under the EBL 2006 Article 85,
also be voted by shareholders.74 Given the insolvency of most companies
in reorganization, pursuant to Article 85, this means cancelling the
previous equity must be agreed by the equity-holders. Professor Li
Shuguang argues that if the company is financially insolvent, the vote of
shareholders is advisory only and is not legally binding on the proposed
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reorganization plan;75 but the EBL 2006 is rather strict, requiring that the
consensus of shareholders is needed. To solve potential deadlocks, if a
reorganization plan failed in winning the vote of any class of creditors or
the class of shareholders or both, under the EBL 2006 Article 87, it can
still be submitted to the court for a forcible approval on the condition that
the statutory tests are passed, which means, as noted before, that cramdown approvals are applicable under the EBL 2006.
Unlike under the USA Chapter 11 where cram-down mainly serves as
a legal leverage to facilitate negotiations between stakeholders, the
Chinese cram-down approval is often used to legitimize corporate
reorganization plans that have been voted down by either creditors or
shareholders or both; a study shows that cram-down approvals are used in
around one quarter of the surveyed Chinese corporate reorganizations.76
Overall, reorganization is intended to be the primary corporate rescue
procedure in China, though the harsh reality is that it is not widely
available for troubled businesses to seek survival. An alternative rescue
procedure is composition under the same EBL 2006.

b. The Composition Procedure under the EBL 2006
In theory, like the reorganization procedure embedded in the EBL
2006 Chapter 8, composition under Chapter 9 is also a rescue procedure.77
If a settlement can be reached between the debtor and its creditors, the
company can avoid being liquidated and survives the bankruptcy crisis.78
Traditionally, composition is always favored by China’s successive
bankruptcy statutes, including the 1935 and 1986 bankruptcy laws.
Compared with reorganization, which was applied, between 2007 and
2015, for some 700 companies,79 composition is quite rarely used, since
there are, during the same period, less than ten composition cases a year
identified in China as a whole.80
Composition applicants: Under the EBL 2006 Article 95, a debtor may
straightforwardly apply to the court to enter into a bankruptcy composition
75
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procedure, and in the event of an existing liquidation, voluntary and
involuntary, the debtor may ask the court to convert it into composition;
in both situations, the debtor must accompany its application with a
composition plan/proposal. But whether a composition procedure can be
formally commenced depends on whether the court agrees with the
debtor’s application; the EBL 2006 Article 96 stipulates that if the court
believes the application is in line with this law, again, without elaborating
which provisions must be specifically conformed to, a court order may be
issued to officially open a composition procedure.81
Logically, this equally means that if the court thinks the debtor’s
composition application does not comply with the EBL 2006 in general,
the debtor’s effort to use this procedure for bankruptcy relief will be
rejected. To some extent, it is of opinion of the court whether a corporate
bankruptcy composition procedure can be entered into. Given the widely
perceived judicial irresponsibility of Chinese courts,82 this is perhaps one
of the major reasons why this bankruptcy procedure is virtually shelved to
the detriment of the China business communities.83 Except debtors, no
other parties, including creditors or shareholders, can initiate a corporate
composition procedure.
With the forty-six composition cases between 2007 and 2015
surveyed, it is found that thirty-six (78%) of them were converted from
liquidations, i.e., these liquidations ended happily, since a composition
plan was agreed by the debtor and its creditors prior to the completion of
liquidations, so that liquidation was avoided. The remaining ten cases
(22%) were filed originally as the composition procedure, which
somewhat suggests that directly commencing a composition procedure
might be more difficult.
Control in compositions: Although it is only the debtor who can
propose a composition plan, the control of the company’s assets and
business affairs is, rather strangely, still in the hands of the court-appointed
administrator. In the event that composition has been transformed from
liquidation, the administrator previously appointed to manage the estate in
the liquidation procedure will remain in office as the party in charge; for a
directly-filed composition, under the EBL 2006 Article 13, the court will
appoint a bankruptcy administrator to take control. It seems that, unlike in
81
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reorganization, debtor-in-possession is not available in a composition
procedure.
It appears, however, paradoxical that, under the EBL 2006 Articles 13
and 95, on the one hand, the court-appointed administrator stays at the
helm of the composition procedure, but that on the other, the composition
plan, the key document in the procedure, can only be proposed by the
debtor. Proposing a composition plan seems to be a substantial right in
nature, which is not bestowed to the administrator, the party in charge. But
in reality, given that most compositions are updated from liquidations,
composition plans are more likely to be prepared by parties other than
debtors instead. To clear up this doubt, fifteen compositions taking place
between 2013 and 2015 are studied by searching more detailed
information from publicly available sources, most of them media reports
from China; there are five cases whose relevant information could be
obtained.
Out of these five compositions, four of them were actually carried out
as company sales, i.e., the creditors and the company buyer used a
composition plan to conclude a sale under which the company as a going
concern was sold to the buyer. Since in these four cases, the debtor behind
which were the shareholders lost everything in the composition procedure,
it was highly unlikely for the composition plan to have been proposed
voluntarily. The most plausible explanation is that these composition plans
were made by a coalition of the administrator, the major creditors and the
company buyer. The debtor’s right in proposing a composition plan might
be significantly marginalized in reality.
In the remaining one case, in which the state-owned company, Puyang
Plastics Limited, Henan Province, successfully used the bankruptcy
composition procedure to solve its bankruptcy trouble in 2013, with the
powerful support from the company’s shareholder, a local government
state-asset management department, the creditors accepted a debt
reduction by voting for the composition plan.84 Essentially, in this case, it
was the local government that made the composition plan. Therefore, it
seems safe to say that, concerning the control model, debtors are in a very
weak position in composition procedures, mainly because it is unrealistic
to translate debtors’ right in proposing composition plans in books into the
right in action.
Composition plans: A composition plan which does not bind secured
creditors must, under the EBL 2006 Article 97, pass the vote of the
unsecured creditors. It is unclear whether unsecured creditors should be,
like in reorganization under the EBL 2006 Article 82, divided into three
84
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classes as employee, tax and ordinary unsecured creditors to vote on a
composition plan. But bearing in mind that most composition plans fully
honor employee and tax authority claims, perhaps, only ordinary
unsecured creditors are to vote.
It is worth noting that under the EBL 2006 Article 96, as stated above,
a composition plan does not bind secured creditors, and that this Article
makes it crystal clear that a secured creditor is exempt from the general
moratorium, which means that in a composition procedure, a secured
creditor can realize encumbered assets without regard to the rescue
procedure. Some comment that this would make composition less
effective in rescuing troubled companies.85 However, this concern might
be considerably alleviated in real cases, since most compositions are
transferred from liquidations in which a previous general moratorium
automatically imposed in liquidation has already prohibited the
foreclosure of securities.86
Similar to a reorganization plan, a composition plan also needs to go
through two stages before taking effect. First, under the EBL 2006 Article
97, it must be voted in favor by over half of attending unsecured creditors
holding over two-thirds of the entire unsecured claims; failing in winning
the vote of unsecured creditors, the composition effort is doomed, and,
under the EBL 2006 Article 99, will be converted into liquidation. Having
gained the consent from the unsecured creditors, under Article 98, the
passed composition plan must be ultimately recognized or approved by the
court; again, this Article does not say how the court will assess the voted
composition plan before giving the blessing.
An approved composition plan must be executed by the debtor
company under the EBL 2006 Article 102, which essentially means that
the debtor will pay the unsecured creditors as promised in the composition
plan. In the light of the prevalence of company sale compositions, the postcomposition debtor might have been largely transformed, since the
rehabilitated debtor is usually under the new ownership of the company
buyer. Under the EBL 2006 Article 104, in the event that the debtor is
unable to, or does not, fulfil its obligations under the approved
composition plan, the court may, at the request of composition creditors,
terminate the execution of the composition plan and directs it into
liquidation straightforwardly; this did happen.87
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To sum up, composition is scarcely used in practice, mainly because
of the judicial inactivity; most existing compositions are converted from
liquidations. Presumably, in these liquidations, if a serious buyer emerges,
converting liquidation into composition would be an effective way to
sustain the company as a legal entity, since liquidation exclusively leads
to the dissolution of the company. Maintaining the debtor company as a
legal entity makes sense in China, for most business licenses will be
revoked by regulators if the company as a legal person is dissolved.88 In
contrast with reorganizations and compositions, liquidation is undoubtedly
the most used bankruptcy procedure in China.

c. The Liquidation Procedure under the EBL 2006
It seems to be an irony that liquidation, the paramount bankruptcy
procedure by number at least, is arranged at the third place in the
bankruptcy choice ladder under the EBL 2006. Nevertheless, its
significance cannot be simply judged over its position in the statutory
order. Between 2007 and 2015, an eight-year period, there were some
27,345 corporate bankruptcy cases dealt with in China as a whole, 26,371
(96%) of them liquidations.89
Liquidation applicants: under the EBL 2006 Article 10, both the
debtor and its creditor, in theory, can file to the local court to open a
liquidation procedure; a single creditor could trigger a liquidation against
the debtor, whereas in the USA, usually there should be at least three
creditors acting jointly to bring a debtor into a liquidation procedure.90 In
contrast to the UK insolvency law under which a wide range of parties,
including the debtor, its directors, creditors and contributories, can initiate
a liquidation case,91 such a right in China is only reserved for the debtor
and its creditors.
For a voluntary liquidation filing, under the EBL 2006 Articles 2 and
7, the debtor must present the evidence to pass both the cash-flow and
balance-sheet bankruptcy tests. In practice, to meet this requirement, the
company usually provides an audited financial report to convince the
court. In contrast, in the USA, a voluntary liquidation application does not
need to show the evidence of the company’s insolvency at all.92 The
concept of bankruptcy relief has not yet been established in China.
88
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With respect to an involuntary liquidation application, it looks easier,
since the EBL 2006 Article 7 only requires the filing creditor to prove the
company’s cash-flow bankruptcy, i.e., the debtor is unable to pay the debt
that is due. In reality, however, it can be frequently identified that many
Chinese courts still require filing creditors to prove that the debtor
company is bankrupt by both the cash-flow and balance-sheet test.93
Although on the fact of it, a liquidation procedure can be initiated very
conveniently by relying on the aforementioned Articles, the law in action
is, to a large extent, different. Most, if not all, Chinese courts turn a blind
eye to corporate liquidation filings; even some local courts, for example,
have not accepted one single corporate liquidation during the first eightyear period following the implementation of the EBL 2006 since 2007.94
And one study estimates that in China, only less than one per cent of
bankrupt companies that are supposed to be placed in judicial bankruptcy
procedures could access the formal liquidation procedure to exit the
market.95
To be realistic, to initiate a corporate liquidation procedure, as well as
reorganization and composition, in China, the political support from local
government is the key condition prior to the local court considering the
application. Even it is not an exaggeration to say that the whole judicial
system does not respond to businesses on bankruptcy issues; rather local
courts only open liquidation procedures at the request of local
government.96 Therefore, to a great extent, local government is the only
eligible party to initiate a judicial company liquidation procedure mainly
for political reasons; it sounds rather abnormal, but it is the reality in the
country.97
Control of Liquidations: Under the EBL 2006 Articles 13 and 25, a
bankruptcy administrator, the liquidator, will be immediately installed by
the court to take possession of the company’s properties and business
93
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affairs; in fact, the company as a whole will be managed by the
administrator in the entire course of liquidation. However, the liquidation
administrator must be heavily supervised by the court. For example, under
the EBL 2006 Article 26, to decide whether the company’s business
operation should be terminated, the administrator must get the permission
from the court; such supervision seems unjustifiable, for even some judges
lament that whether to keep the company’s business operation on is a
commercial, rather than legal, assessment, and that judges are not
professionally fit to do this job.98
Meanwhile, under the EBL 2006 Article 69, before disposing of the
company’s substantial assets, including, among others, land, buildings,
and intellectual properties, the administrator must get the advance
permission either from the court or from the creditors committee; bearing
in mind the creditors committee is rarely formed,99 asking for the
permission from the court is the condition before the administrator taking
action to deal with the company’s key assets. This leads to some
commenting that bankruptcy administrators in China somewhat act as the
assistants of judges in corporate liquidations.100 Hence, corporate
liquidations in China are heavily court-controlled in real terms.
Value Distribution in Liquidations: After realizing the company’s
assets, the bankruptcy administrator, under the EBL 2006 Article 115,
must prepare a value distribution plan, which is to be voted at the meeting
of creditors and needs to be confirmed by the court afterwards. Pursuant
to the EBL 2006 Article 64, the value distribution plan is passed if it is
voted in favor by over half of attending creditors in number whose claims
represent over half of the unsecured debts in value. Compared with the
passage of a corporate reorganization plan that needs the support of
creditors over half in number and over two-thirds in claims,101 the
threshold of passing a liquidation value distribution plan seems to be easier
to cross.
Concerning the priority of distributing the value of the company
between various parties, the EBL 2006 Article 113 creates a payment
hierarchy according to which after meeting liquidation costs, including the
98
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administrator’s fees, liquidation expenses and post-liquidation debts, the
value of the company goes to paying employees at first, followed by tax
claims and, in the case of a surplus, pays ordinary unsecured creditors, and
if any of these three classes of unsecured creditors could not be paid in
full, pari passu applies. The question here is that, in view of the fact how
to distribute the value of a company in liquidation has been clearly
regulated by the law, why the value distribution plan still needs the
approval, a second assessment, of creditors. In the UK, the liquidator only
needs to report the value distribution issues to the meeting of creditors,
and no vote of creditors on this is required;102 in the USA, a Chapter 7
liquidation trustee is to distribute the value of the estate to creditors under
the law, and no vote of creditors is held.103 The absurdity of China’s EBL
2006 on this should be rethought.
The most contentious over value distribution appears to be the priority
between employees and secured creditors in China.104 Under the EBL
2006 Articles 109 and 113, it is a general principle for secured assets to be
sold to meet secured claims first, but the EBL 2006 Article 132 makes an
exception that employee claims generated before the EBL 2006 taking
effect, namely, 1st June 2007, should be paid ahead of secured creditors.
Some historic context should be explained here for a better understanding.
Under the old EBL 1986 Article 28, secured creditors are paid from
realizing secured assets and are technically ranked before employees; but
this principle is later undermined by an executive notice entitled ‘The
Policies on the Bankruptcy of SOEs in the Selected Cities’ issued by the
China State Council, the Chinese central government, in 1994,105 which
reverses the statutory priority between secured creditors and employees in
the bankruptcies of SOEs that are located in eighteen cities designated by
the State Council as the national SOE bankruptcy experimental areas.
Strictly speaking, the priority of securities is still retained in the
bankruptcy of SOEs that are not from these selected eighteen cities; of
course, in the bankruptcy of private companies, securities must be
absolutely respected, at least in theory.
Unfortunately, the 1994 notice was frequently abused by local
governments to use the money of secured creditors, almost all of them
102
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central-government-owned banks, to resettle the employees of troubled
local SOEs, whether these SOEs are from the eighteen chosen cities or
not.106 Five years later, in 1999, the Chinese central government
succumbed to the demands of local governments, in a new policy notice,
allowing employee claims to be paid before securities in the bankruptcy
of all SOEs, wherever they are from.107 The priority of employees over
secured creditors is widely practiced in the bankruptcy of SOEs in China,
but is unlawful, since it is against both the spirit and letters of the EBL
1986, and inevitably it invited much criticism.108
The EBL 2006 seems to have somewhat legalized and expanded such
a priority on two fronts, however. First, its Article 133 elevates and
reaffirms the successive policies on the bankruptcy of SOEs issued by the
China State Council, maintaining that the bankruptcy of SOEs is subject
to the policies issued by the State Council, which solves the legal conflict
between the old EBL 1986 and the aforementioned executive notices. In
substance, this Article reassures that in the bankruptcy of SOEs, the
priority of employees over secured creditors is retained and continues to
apply, before and after the promulgation of the EBL 2006. Second, rather
than exclusively prioritizing employees over secured creditors in the
bankruptcy of SOEs under the old regulations, the EBL 2006 Article 132
expands such a priority to the bankruptcy of all non-SOE enterprises, but
only favors the employee claims accumulated before the EBL 2006 came
into force on 1 June 2017.
Obviously, it is a political concession made during the making of the
EBL 2006.109 But it is worth noting that respecting securities in corporate
bankruptcies in China is a norm, and in only exceptional occasions,
securities are to give way to employees.
After using the value generated from selling the company’s assets,
tangible and intangible, to pay creditors, the liquidation administrator will
inform the company registration authorities to remove the company from
the official company list. But in practice, this is not easy. The China Tax
Management Law 2001 Article 16 requires that a company could not be
deregistered if there is unpaid tax. Given that in many company
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bankruptcies, tax authorities could not be fully repaid; usually the
company registration authority simply refuses to delete the company’s
name from the official list.110

V.

CONCLUSION

Although China enacted much-awaited EBL 2006, its implementation
remains considerably weak. Only a meagre proportion of bankrupt
companies could access bankruptcy procedures under the new law to exit
the market. In spite of the creation of the new rescue-friendly
reorganization procedure in this law, the overwhelming majority of
existing bankruptcies are liquidations. Another rescue procedure,
composition, is almost forgotten in judicial practice, since only less than
fifty cases between 2007 and 2015 are identified.
In general, regarding the legislative objective in promoting a corporate
rescue culture in China, apparently, given that the new rescue procedure
is only occasionally used at the request of local government to rehabilitate
large local companies and that most pro-rescue legislative innovations are
not really used, it is perhaps difficult to say that this objective has been
achieved. Meanwhile, in view of a small number of bankruptcy cases
handled in China annually, there are indeed few cases for the newly
qualified insolvency practitioners to practice and to improve their skills
and expertise, so that the mission of establishing a well-functioning
insolvency profession also cannot be said a success. In addition, the goal
of facilitating international cooperation on cross-border corporate
insolvencies seems to be a total failure, as Chinese law courts have not yet
relied on the new recognition procedure to assist any foreign insolvency
office holders. The implementation of the EBL 2006 in the past ten years
is largely a fiasco.
Arguably, as for the way forward, the current court-centered
bankruptcy system should be overhauled, and a market-based bankruptcy
regime, mainly relying on the work of insolvency practitioners, including
lawyers and accountants, might be the future if China does need an
effective bankruptcy system. It should be addressed that the Chinese ruling
class, including governments and courts, does not need a corporate
bankruptcy law, but the China business community comprising creditors
and debtors desperately crave for an effective and efficient bankruptcy law
so as to either seek fairness or look for relief.
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At the moment, the only hope would be that the international
communities, especially the USA and the EU, keep on imposing pressure
on China for legal reform; expecting China’s internal forces to reform its
legal system in general and the bankruptcy system in particular, it seems,
is more likely to be met with disappointment.

